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Abstract 
This paper investigates whether the activities of start-ups specialising in artificial 
intelligence (AI)-powered solutions could contribute to upgrading in dependent market 
economies. Mapping the ecosystem of Hungarian AI-solution providers, collecting, and 
analysing data of their solutions, activities, and performance, we identify the main 
mechanisms of AI-driven upgrading. We argue that AI-solution providers induce productivity 
and resource efficiency improvement at technology adopters by enabling process 
upgrading. By selling their services to the local subsidiaries of global companies, they 
intensify the local backward linkages of these companies. Increased local embeddedness 
of subsidiaries is an important manifestation of economic upgrading. Additionally, AI-
solution providers diversify the drivers of growth. In dependent market economies, where 
export-oriented manufacturing activities controlled by efficiency-seeking foreign investors 
used to be the main (unique) growth engine, the activities of domestic-owned AI solution 
providers represent a new driver of growth: technology-oriented entrepreneurship. We 
found, however, that the economic impact of Hungarian AI-oriented ventures is limited, no 
matter how innovative their solutions are. Managerial implications include the 
indispensability of devising an adequate business development strategy and a value 
capture strategy. Without adequate entrepreneurial skills, and without being visible on the 
global stage of ‘AI-start-ups to watch’, the development prospects of even the most 
innovative ventures are limited. A key policy implication for supporting the scaling up of AI 
start-ups by promoting the adoption of AI-powered solutions and stimulating venture capital 
financing promises good return on public investments. 
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Introduction 
For observers relating global power transitions to changes in techno-economic paradigms, 
the rapid development and ubiquitous diffusion of artificial intelligence represents a 
strategic opportunity to catch up and/or forge ahead.  
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Artificial intelligence (AI) is defined as a system, composed of hardware and software, that 
is capable of processing, synthesising, and learning from big data and information from 
various sources in order to perform (automate or support) tasks that used to be performed 
only by humans. AI is considered the paradigm-leading, general purpose technology of the 
“Second Machine Age” (Brynjolffson & McAfee, 2014). It will revolutionise many areas of 
economic activity and induce complementary innovations with a transformative impact on 
economy and society.  
From a historical perspective, the emergence of new paradigm-leading technologies 
generate changes in the balance of economic power (Horowitz et al., 2018; Perez, 2002). It 
is by no surprise that while the current AI superpowers (the United States and China) 
announce strategic plans aimed at achieving global leadership in AI, many other advanced 
and emerging economies also develop AI strategies, aimed at AI-based upgrading and 
catch-up (e.g. COMM, 2018; Horowitz et al., 2018; Lee, 2018).1 
Considering the magnitude of AI superpowers’ efforts and the fact that strong first-mover 
advantages are expected to be obtained in an ‘AI race for strategic advantage’ (Cave & 
ÓhÉigertaigh, 2018), this paper investigates the chances of an AI-based development in 
dependent market economies (DMEs), whose modernisation has, so far, been driven by 
efficiency-seeking foreign direct investment (Nölke & Vliegenthart, 2009).  
The question in the case of these countries is not whether specialisation in AI-associated 
technology provision could induce a kind of leapfrog development – as is happening in 
China. The opportunity to be considered for these countries is rather that of mitigating their 
current excessive reliance on ‘low-cost manufacturing location’-based integration in global 
value chains (GVCs). Since AI-powered labour-saving technologies will particularly 
adversely affect jobs in activities that had been offshored to DMEs with a 
resource/efficiency-seeking motivation, upgrading by diversifying the drivers of growth 
seems indispensable. 
However, upgrading through AI-based innovation and entrepreneurship in DMEs is 
contingent on negative answers to two questions. Is AI a developed country issue? Is AI-
based competition confined to large and powerful economic actors?  
Intuition suggests an affirmative answer to both these questions. On one hand, digital 
technologies, network externalities, and globalisation enhance the concentration of 
industries and markets (Bajgar et al., 2018). Furthermore, there is a widely noted 
development towards winner-take-all structures: ‘superstar firms’ tend to capture increasing 
share of total income and profit across a variety of industries, in particular, in service 
industries featuring a higher-than-the-average level of digital technology adoption (Manyika 
et al., 2018; Van Reenen, 2018). On the other hand, building AI capabilities in terms of 
recruiting and paying AI-talent, and investing in expensive computing resources to train 
machines involve huge costs. This can be afforded only by well-capitalised or generously 
funded firms. 
                                                          
1 See also: https://medium.com/politics-ai/an-overview-of-national-ai-strategies-2a70ec6edfd for an 
international overview. 
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By contrast, this paper argues that even small DMEs can benefit from fostering 
specialisation in AI-associated activities, since this strategy can mitigate the looming 
negative impacts of AI-powered job automation.  
The context of the study is Hungary, a DME, whose modernisation and growth have so far 
been driven by efficiency-seeking foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows in manufacturing 
(Farkas, 2011). Hungary was selected mainly because of the author’s familiarity with the 
ecosystem of digital technology providers in this country. We survey a sample of 
domestically-owned companies specialising in AI-associated activities, whose cases are 
used to illustrate the mechanisms of AI-driven upgrading.   
By mapping the Hungarian AI ecosystem and gathering both primary and secondary data 
on AI technology providers, we show that specialisation in AI-associated activities can 
induce new kinds of upgrading mechanisms that diversify and complement the FDI-based 
upgrading trajectories in DMEs.  
Since Hungary is a low/moderate performing country in terms of both innovation (European 
Innovation Scoreboard, 2018) and business digitalisation performance,2 the experiences of 
the surveyed companies cannot be generalised into optimistic macroeconomic conclusions. 
Nevertheless, the insights derived from the analysis of their activities offer useful policy 
lessons and have some thought-provoking managerial implications.  
Accordingly, the contribution of this paper is twofold. First it extends our understanding of 
the mechanisms of AI-driven upgrading through illustrative examples and business use 
cases. Second, it offers empirical evidence covering an under-researched country case. 
The paper proceeds as follows. It starts with a short review of the related literature and 
focuses on the main mechanisms of AI-driven upgrading. This is followed by the 
presentation of the research method. Next, we present and discuss the results, provide 
some concluding remarks, and elaborate on managerial and policy implications. 
1  Theoretical background 
AI is a solution combining software and hardware elements. This solution ingests and 
processes data and information from multiple sources so as to perform and automate tasks 
that were previously only performed by humans (Taddy, 2019). AI and related machine 
learning are considered general purpose technologies. They are bound to penetrate in and 
transform all sectors of the economy, disrupt existing and create new industries and 
services, accelerate and intensify all kinds of innovation activities, and have a 
transformative impact also on a variety of social processes (Brynjolfsson et al., 2018, Chui, 
2019). 
However, radical technological change often exacerbates inequality – not only within (cf. 
the literature on widening wage gaps and labour market polarisation, e.g. Goos et al., 2014) 
but also across countries (Bajgar et al., 2018; Comin & Mestieri, 2018). The extra wealth (to 
be) created by AI is likely to be shared unequally across countries (Hallward-Driemayer & 
Nayyar, 2017), which requires doubling policy efforts to enhance the impact of AI on 
upgrading at all levels. 
                                                          
2 Regarding the business digitalisation pillar of the composite Digital Economy and Society Index, 
Hungary scores the second lowest in EU28, preceding only Romania (DESI, 2018). 
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The notion of upgrading is widely used in GVC-analyses (Gereffi & Fernandez-Stark, 2011) 
denoting firms’ move towards higher-than-before value adding activities as a result of 
competence accumulation. Upgrading can be manifested in the field of new and higher-
value products, improved-efficiency processes, new and higher value generating business 
functions, or new sectors, markets and business models (Humphrey & Schmitz, 2002).  
Upgrading is frequently discussed also in a macroeconomic context. The economic 
upgrading of countries is driven by the upgrading of a large, above-a-threshold number of 
firms that manage to increase the value added nature of their activities (e.g. OECD, 2013; 
Kummritz et al., 2017). Nevertheless, interpreting economic upgrading as a simple 
aggregation of firm-level upgrading risks ignoring some developments that also represent 
qualitative improvement of national performance. When analysing the mechanisms of AI-
driven upgrading, our discussion will, therefore, not be limited to Humphrey and Schmitz’s 
(2002) firm-level upgrading categories; other macro-level developments will also be 
considered. 
Technological change in general, and AI in particular, can drive upgrading by four 
mechanisms, as follows. One is process upgrading enabled by the adoption of AI-powered 
solutions, resulting in the improvement of productivity and of operational excellence.  
Another mechanism is functional upgrading, which refers here to companies 
complementing their primary (production) activities with AI-associated R&D. Taking up 
knowledge-intensive, usually software development related activities and business 
functions is indispensable for the adoption and use of AI. 
Manufacturing and practically all other business processes and functions are characterised 
by high and increasing software-intensity which reinforces the globalisation of R&D 
(Branstetter et al., 2019). Consequently, even the manufacturing subsidiaries of 
multinational corporations (MNCs) often take up AI-specific R&D and/or become engaged 
in AI-supported product development, at least more often than previously. Additionally, the 
adoption of AI-powered solutions is usually accompanied by organisational and 
technological learning, capability development, and an increased demand for and 
employment of highly skilled workers (see Burger et al. (2018) on functional upgrading in 
Central and Eastern European countries). 
The third mechanism is upgrading through the intensification of MNC subsidiaries’ local 
backward linkages. AI-solutions are not off-the-shelf ones: they address customer-specific 
business cases. Consequently, their deployment requires significant domain-specific 
expertise (to understand customers’ business processes and determine the key 
performance indicators to be improved). This expertise is developed through a series of 
interactions between the technology providers and the would-be users (Taddy, 2019), 
which calls for selecting local technology providers. 
This latter mechanism is closely associated with the fourth channel of AI-driven economic 
upgrading, that of local actors’ innovation-based entrepreneurship, internationalisation, and 
rapid growth. Worldwide, digital transformation and specialisation in the provision of AI-
powered solutions have boosted new forms of innovation, multiplied the number, and 
accelerated the evolution of entrepreneurial ventures (Nambisan, 2017). This is reflected by 
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a rising number of unicorns,3 start-ups valued at $ 1 billion or more. Although most of them 
are from the United States and China, some dependent economy actors, such as 
Indonesia, Philippines, or Estonia are also present in this list. Nevertheless, from the 
perspective of economic growth through Schumpeterian entrepreneurship (cf. Lafuente et 
al., 2019), it is not the achievement of the predetermined threshold of $ 1 billion that 
matters, particularly not in the surveyed DMEs, but, rather, the highest possible number of 
technology-oriented (in our case: AI-oriented), rapidly growing and internationalising start-
ups. 
2  Research method 
The research method adopted for this study is a combination of desk research and 
interview-based research. Desk research was aimed at mapping Hungarian, domestically-
owned companies that develop core AI technologies, or integrate AI technologies into their 
products or product–service solutions. This exploratory exercise combined a survey of 
business press and technology press articles4 describing, among others, the AI-related 
activities and achievements of Hungarian companies, and a review of secondary source 
data on members of two Hungarian associations: the Industry 4.0 National Technology 
Platform and the (Hungarian) Artificial Intelligence Coalition.5  
Additionally, the author’s participation in an AI-related workshop in 2019, where Hungarian 
start-ups presented their solutions also provided invaluable insights about the activities and 
performance of Hungarian entrepreneurial ventures specialised in AI-associated technology 
provision. 
This exploratory data collection yielded a sample of 29 Hungarian companies producing AI-
technology and AI-enabled solutions (Table 1). We focused on domestically owned 
ventures and excluded the ones that had been taken over by foreign companies. Foreign-
owned subsidiaries engaged in AI-related research were also excluded. 
Table 1 | Summary 2018 data of the surveyed companies (turnover is in € ‘000). 
No. 
Foun-
dation 
Profile 
Turnover  
(Target 
market) 
Employ-
ment 
1. 2007 
Development of an autonomous decision support 
system for optimisation of logistics planning; a 
maintenance scheduling system, and a diagnostics 
management system (for a biopharmaceutical 
company). 
3,943 
(D) 
12 
2. 2017 
Development of an industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) 
platform that is based on big data technologies and 
machine learning. The platform supports smart 
25 
(D) 
10 
                                                          
3 According to the regularly updated unicorn list of CB Insights, the number of unicorns in mid-2019 
was 350. https://www.cbinsights.com/research-unicorn-companies, retrieved on: 20, May, 2019. 
4 The articles have been collected from a variety of sources, including www.techmonitor.hu, and 
www.gyartastrend.hu, both offering a collection of articles on industrial applications of new technology, 
and case studies of Hungarian and international actors developing particular digital solutions. 
Additionally, the websites www.computerworld.hu, www.hwsw.hu, and www.itbusiness.hu have also 
proved useful sources of information about Hungary-based AI-associated companies. 
5 In May, 2019, AI Coalition had 178 members. Approximately one third of the members were business 
enterprises engaged in AI-related activities, while other members included NGOs, e.g. professional and 
industry associations, and governmental organisations, consultancy firms, and higher education 
institutions. 
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factory applications, such as predictive maintenance, 
and is capable of implementing machine-learning-
powered process optimisation. 
3. 2016 
A solution designed for continuous water monitoring, 
automatic detection and AI-aided classification of 
organisms in water. The system is capable of 
alerting in case of anomalies. 
40 
(D & E) 
5 
4. 2013 
AI-powered modelling of cell responses to cancer 
treatment at molecular level, running simulated 
experiments to identify new biomarkers and 
combination therapies in drug development. 
284 
(E) 
28 
5. 2013 
A solution recognising, converting and transcribing 
voice to text, specialised in legal terminology. 
152 
(D) 
1 
6. 2017 
An AI-powered video analytics solution applied, 
among others, in retail to learn shoppers’ patterns. It 
predicts and reduces queues, traces people, and 
detects anomalies.  
10 
(D & E) 
35 
7. 2018 
AI projects for telecom network surveillance and 
anomaly detection. 
n.a. 1 
8. 2010 
Provision of data analytics and business intelligence 
solutions. 
179 
(D) 
0 
9. 2018 
Provision of a warehouse inventory management 
solution that combines commercial drones and AI-
based analytics. 
7 
(D) 
1 
10. 2009 
An AI-powered solution for web-shops, supporting 
visitors and providing personalised 
recommendations. 
183 
(D & E) 
3 
11. 1994 
An integrated risk management and a credit 
approval system for financial institutions.  
847 
(D & E) 
23 
12. 2014 
An integrated digital ergonomics system: a motion 
digitising and evaluating device that captures, 
measures, records, and analyses data related to 
assembly workers’ motion to be used for ergonomic 
analyses and testing. 
7 
(E) 
4 
13. 2015 
Development of a self-driving software stack; 
Development of a simulation solution for testing 
autonomous vehicles. 
5,000* 
(E) 
182 
14. 2012 
Development of connected vehicle technology to be 
integrated in on-board units or roadside units. 
1,000* 
(E) 
30 
15. 2013 
Design and implementation of smart factory 
solutions coupled with analytics for manufacturing 
companies. Data-driven and AI-powered business 
process reengineering and optimisation, solution of 
technological problems. Implementation of machine 
learning solutions to support autonomous decision-
making. 
67 
(D) 
2 
16. 2012 
Provision of data analytics, data warehousing, and 
business intelligence solutions. 
1,700* 
(D) 
14 
17. 2006 
Provision of big data, data visualisation, and 
analytics-based solution of company-specific 
problems; data engineering, data warehousing, 
cloud data services, data integration, and strategic 
consulting relying on data science approaches. 
9,400* 
(E) 
136 
18. 2014 
Automation of customer relationship management 
through AI bots. 
24 
(E) 
5 
19. 2015 
Development of a solution to prevent fraud with 
online advertising by detecting robots and suspicious 
traffic, and then measuring the real visibility of 
advertisements. 
244 
(D & E) 
5 
  Volume 8 | Number 4 | 2019 
https://doi.org/10.18267/j.cebr.219 
 
 
46 CENTRAL EUROPEAN BUSINESS REVIEW 
 
20. 2004 
Development of a human speech processing 
solution to be applied in virtual customer service 
assistants; assists customers with self-service or 
channels them to the appropriate customer service 
operator. Provision of business intelligence services.  
1,074 
(D) 
12 
21. 2004 
A variety of smart solutions, including road condition 
mapping, security solutions based on computer 
vision and video analysis, traffic monitoring and 
analysis, social network analysis, voice call analysis, 
sign language translation, etc. 
556 
(D & E) 
13 
22. 2017 
Development of a smart insurance (pay as you drive) 
application based on vehicle telematics and big data. 
1.8 
(E) 
2 
23. 2016 
Enterprise chatbot development, system integration, 
bot data analysis, marketing automation services. 
550 
(E) 
4 
24. 2011 
AI-powered personalisation solutions (of search, 
product recommendations, e-mail marketing, 
couponing, video services etc.) 
3,440* 
(E) 
34 
25. 2018 
AI-powered robotic task automation, e.g. invoice 
processing, machine vision-based quality control, 
predictive maintenance, demand prediction. 
n.a. 
(D & E) 
12 
26. 2008 
Development of an intelligent search and data 
collection engine; a text analytics solution (e.g. 
medical texts); provision of software development, 
system integration, and business intelligence 
services. 
420 
(D & E) 
28 
27. 2012 
Development of a customer loyalty management 
platform that drives omnichannel customer 
engagement through programmes, personalisation, 
customer profiling, and business intelligence. 
674 
(E) 
20 
28. 2015 AI-powered translation technology. 
5,000 
(E) 
47 
29. 2012 
Development of a social listening and business 
intelligence tool that provides a real-time quantitative 
and qualitative analysis of social media and other 
Internet content, e.g. with respect to selected 
companies, brands, etc. It measures the efficiency of 
social media marketing and the evolution of public 
perception of the given company/brand. 
242 
(D & E) 
 
3 
* = rounded, E = mainly export sales, D = mainly domestic sales  
Source: author’s compilation 
 
We reviewed the websites of the companies in the sample and collected press articles 
describing their activities and achievements. Next, we collected data about the basic 
corporate performance indicators (year of establishment, turnover, employment) and about 
the specifics of the technology developed by these companies. Additionally, we reviewed 
their references, i.e. the list of their major customers and the use cases that were described 
on their websites or in business press articles. We complemented our secondary-source 
data with information obtained from the presentations of their representatives at the 
workshop mentioned previously and with data obtained from interviews conducted with five 
companies in this sample. These interviews were conducted during February–March 2019 
in the framework of a separate research project on digital entrepreneurship in Hungary.6 
                                                          
6 Twelve Hungarian digital entrepreneurs were interviewed in the framework of that research project. 
Five of them are engaged in AI-associated activities. Since the interview guide we used coincides with 
the focus of this research (it consisted of open-ended question organised around three topics: the 
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Our data analysis consisted of two components. Sample firms’ data were coded according 
to categories related to their profile (AI-associated activities and use cases) and business 
performance. This coding exercise was complemented with the qualitative analysis of the 
firms’ impact on economic upgrading, along the theoretical categories outlined in the 
previous section. 
The reliability and validity of our findings was ensured through cross-case comparisons. 
Additionally, we tested our arguments developed on the basis of the analysis of the 
surveyed firms’ data by asking the managers interviewed to comment on them. The draft 
version of the paper was sent to all interviewees for feedback. 
3  Findings 
Our mapping exercise helped us identify a diverse set of Hungarian firms engaged in AI-
powered solution development or in the development of core AI technology. The basic data 
of the surveyed start-ups (establishment, number of employees, revenues) revealed that 
most of them are young,7 micro or small companies, both in terms of employment and 
revenues. There were only two firms with more than 50 employees, and the turnover of 21 
firms out of 29 was below EUR 1 million in 2018. 
The surveyed firms are all vertically focussed: their transactions are of a business-to-
business (B2B) type. They target various industries, and support or automate numerous 
business functions. Accordingly, their customer base is highly heterogeneous.8 Nine 
companies in the sample target mainly the domestic market, eleven firms are mainly export-
oriented, and in the case of the rest, domestic and foreign customers account for a more or 
less balanced share of the revenues. Since the adoption of AI technologies requires a 
relatively high degree of technology readiness by users, their key customers – both the 
domestic and the foreign ones – are usually large and powerful organizations, often global 
‘blue chip’ companies or their local subsidiaries (Table 2). 
  
                                                                                                                                                  
history of the venture, the specifics of product and market development, and the specifics of the 
venture’s ecosystem) we could use the interview results of these five companies to complement the 
secondary-source information collected in the course of this research project. 
7 16 firms were founded after 2012. On average, sample companies have been operating for 6 years in 
2019. 
8 Some firms have currently only one single or a couple of powerful customers, while others have 
dozens of corporate users of their solutions. 
  Volume 8 | Number 4 | 2019 
https://doi.org/10.18267/j.cebr.219 
 
 
48 CENTRAL EUROPEAN BUSINESS REVIEW 
 
Table 2 | Some of the key customers of the surveyed firms* 
AI solutions, applications, algorithms♦ Examples of customers 
Enterprise solutions (business intelligence, 
analytics) 
Fortune 500 companies: e.g. Apple, Tesla, 
Facebook, Netflix, Honeywell, ABB 
Hungarian and foreign companies and 
governmental organisations: Renault, National 
Tax and Customs Administration, Vodafone, DB 
Schenker, CIB Bank, MOL 
AI solutions supporting or automating 
business functions such as marketing, HR, 
customer services, inventory management, 
risk management, ergonomics, R&D 
Large Hungarian or foreign banks, public utility 
companies, insurance companies, 
telecommunication services providers, 
webshops, retail companies, manufacturing 
companies: e.g. OTP, Vodafone, Telenor, 
Allianz, Aegon, E-On, IKEA, Auchan, Decathlon, 
Audi, Bayer 
AI solutions powering operations, e.g. in 
manufacturing and logistics (resource 
optimization, predictive maintenance, 
anomaly detection) 
EGIS, Mercedes Benz Manufacturing, Audi 
Hungaria, Magna Automotive, Waberer, MOL 
AI solutions supporting compliance 
Hungarian food industry firms, public utilities, 
banks  
AI solutions supporting cyber security, 
surveillance, and fraud prevention 
Media companies & other diverse users: T-
Mobile, Sanoma Media, Saturn, Danone, Erste 
Bank, municipalities, department stores 
Core AI technology development: V2X,  
autonomous vehicle technologies, industrial 
Internet of Things Platform 
Collaboration in research, sales and 
demonstration projects with Ford, Jaguar, Alps 
Electric Co., Qualcomm, NXP, Autotalks, Groupe 
PSA, Global Foundries, Kyocera, Volvo, Nvidia, 
Samsung, municipalities in U.S., UK, France, 
collaboration with Cloudera, Dell 
Notes: * The table is not intended to be exhaustive; each solution integrates several companies 
Source: author’s compilation.  
 
The heterogeneity of both the application fields and the customers reflects the general-
purpose character of AI. At the same time this impeded the unambiguous classification and 
grouping of the surveyed firms. We intended to cluster the firms in terms of the kinds of 
upgrading induced by their activities, e.g. process upgrading and productivity improvement, 
technology-oriented entrepreneurship, multiplication of MNC subsidiaries’ backward 
linkages.9 We found that the majority of the surveyed solutions applies to each of these 
categories. 
For instance, AI-powered robotic process automation solutions developed by the surveyed 
domestic entrepreneurs enhance the productivity of technology adopting firms. 
Consequently, in these cases the first channel of AI-driven upgrading is relevant. Since the 
given firms are domestically-owned entrepreneurs, the fourth channel also applies to their 
case. However, the analysis of the customer base of these firms revealed that some 
customers were MNCs’ local subsidiaries. Accordingly, the third channel, the intensification 
of MNCs’ local backward linkages is also relevant. And finally, since the integration of AI-
powered solutions in technology adopting firms’ business processes required the 
                                                          
9 Since our sample consists of Hungarian start-ups, this study investigates only three of the four 
mechanisms of AI-driven upgrading discussed in the previous section. AI adoption-driven functional 
upgrading at local manufacturing subsidiaries is not discussed. 
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collaboration of adopting firms’ engineers, whose expertise was indispensable for the 
customisation of the given solutions, technology adoption was accompanied by the 
functional upgrading of MNCs’ local subsidiaries (second channel). 
As a result, instead of using a discretionary method to group the sample companies 
according to the upgrading categories they represent, we first analysed the scope of 
process upgrading. Our data analysis suggests that the solutions developed by the 
surveyed companies automate or support very specific parts of users’ complex value 
generation processes. Some of the solutions automate or support activities, the productivity 
of which was previously not even measured at technology adopters. Examples include 
enterprise chatbot development for customer engagement and marketing purposes; 
deployment of a platform for AI-powered internal communication (between the management 
and blue-collar workers) and workflow management. One company developed a system to 
improve the productivity of cancer drug discovery, i.e. the productivity of finding effective 
combinations through AI-powered modelling how cancer works at the molecular level, and 
simulating millions of combinations. Again, the scope of productivity improvement is hard to 
measure in this case, since it can be evaluated only ex-post, if an effective combination is 
found, by comparing the speed and costs of this method with those of a traditional trial and 
error approach. 
In other cases, productivity and resource efficiency improvement were easy to calculate. 
For example, a warehouse inventory management solution (No. 9) replaced, on average, 
two full time employees after adopting the technology. The number of employees replaced 
(or working time saved) by AI-powered solutions was easy to calculate also in other use 
cases, for example, in the case of automation of invoice processing10 or water quality 
monitoring, automatic transcription of speech into text, or in cases when AI-powered 
translation solutions were applied. It needs to be noted though that substitution of human 
work for capital does not necessarily lead to reduction in headcount: employees replaced in 
one activity often move to perform new tasks in the same company. In any case, adopters’ 
productivity is bound to improve as a consequence. Since AI-powered task automation 
eliminated the least interesting, repetitive activities, the reallocation of workers to other, 
more ambitious activities, accompanied by relevant training, leads to the upgrading of work.  
An easy-to-quantify example of the impact of AI on resource efficiency was observed at an 
automotive seats manufacturer. The AI-powered automation of quality control was found to 
reduce the loss of raw material by 63%.  
In other cases, the deployment of an AI-powered solution for predictive maintenance 
reduced unplanned downtime, scrap, and maintenance costs, and increased the mean time 
between machine failures. The optimisation of route planning for a truck fleet operator 
increased average truck usage from 87% to 92 %. 
The extent of process upgrading-related productivity or resource efficiency improvement 
can be considered marginal in some of these cases, since they are manifested in narrow 
areas of adopters’ complex business processes. Moreover, technology adopters have been 
devoting efforts to improve the given performance indicators (efficiency of inventory 
                                                          
10 This refers to the digitalisation of paper-based invoices so as to integrate them in the enterprise 
resource planning system. AI was trained to recognise, interpret and process invoices in various 
formats. 
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management, unplanned downtime, scrap, fleet asset utilisation rate, etc.) for decades. 
Consequently, these indicators had already reflected very good performance even before 
technology adopters invested in new, AI-powered solutions and the scope for further 
improvement was limited. 
Nevertheless, the indicator considered by the customers of the surveyed firms is not the 
extent of productivity or resource efficiency improvement to be achieved through the 
deployment of the given solution. Customers are rather concerned with return on 
investment (ROI), which allowed the companies in our sample to team up with and gain 
business opportunities from MNCs’ local subsidiaries or from large foreign companies. 
Next, we analysed the economic impact of the surveyed entrepreneurial ventures in terms 
of the entrepreneurial outcome of their activities. 
In line with the fact that sample companies supply valuable, rare, inimitable, and non-
substitutable (VRIN) solutions (Barney, 1991), part of them have been highly successful in 
acquiring and retaining large, powerful, domestic or foreign-owned customers (including 
Fortune 500 companies). However, the business performance of at least half of the 
surveyed companies, as measured by the usual indicators of sales and employment, 
seems meagre, at least if compared to what the international success stories of AI start-ups 
suggest.11 The turnover of half12 of the firms in the sample (13 companies) was below EUR 
250,000 (the turnover of eight companies was below EUR 100,000). The average turnover 
was EUR 1.3 million across the sample (n=27) in 2018, but that of the low-growth half of the 
sample was only EUR 91,000. The average number of employees was 23.2, however, 
without the two large outlier companies, this average was only 13.1. Consequently, it 
seems safe to maintain that half of the surveyed firms remained (so far) exposed to the 
common growth constraints faced by DME firms, however innovative their solutions are.  
3  Discussion, conclusion and implications 
The focus of this article was on the ways the AI applications developed by the surveyed 
companies contribute to upgrading. The results make us conclude that despite the 
innovativeness of sample firms’ solutions and irrespective of the fact that their activities 
have an unambiguously positive impact on upgrading, these cases are not sufficiently 
robust for shifting Hungary to an innovation-driven growth trajectory, or for enabling the 
country’s escaping from the trap of dependence on low-local-value-added, export-oriented 
manufacturing activities established by efficiency-seeking FDI.  
Although our mapping of domestic-owned entrepreneurs engaged in AI-related research 
and development is by no means exhaustive, it can be plausibly claimed that the number of 
Hungarian AI-oriented digital entrepreneurs is statistically insignificant. Additionally, the 
sales performance of only a few of the surveyed highly innovative digital entrepreneurs 
exceeds EUR one million: in this sense, most of the surveyed firms have remained micro 
                                                          
11 Note that most business press articles and international databases on AI start-ups report data only 
on the valuation and the funding of the given companies. By contrast, company-level data on revenues 
or employment are scarce. Anecdotal evidence indicates that most AI start-ups find it hard to generate 
adequate revenues to build business: often they are valued far more highly than what their revenue 
performance would suggest (Basta, 2016). 
12 We had exact turnover data only for 27 firms. 
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enterprises. Except for a couple of companies, the sample firms failed to become important 
job creators.  
One of the thought-provoking findings was that the business performance of the surveyed 
firms was apparently weakly related to their export orientation. There were several export-
oriented companies (No. 12, 18, 22) that have, so far, failed to scale up. Conversely, a 
number of mainly or uniquely domestically-oriented companies were identified whose sales 
performance was much better than the average (e.g. No. 1, 11, 16, and 20).  
The relatively high share of companies targeting mainly the domestic market challenges the 
assumption that digital entrepreneurs – in particular, the ones specialised in highly 
innovative, AI-powered services provision – can access global markets relatively easily. 
The claim that they would pursue the identified opportunities at a geographically less 
restricted scale than traditional, brick-and-mortar entrepreneurs (Nambisan, 2017) is also 
called into question. 
Altogether, irrespective of the high R&D-intensity of their activities, which is an important 
indicator of economic upgrading, the impact of the surveyed firms on the economy has 
remained, so far, limited. 
Nevertheless, it can be concluded that specialisation in AI-associated activities 
unequivocally contributes to upgrading for three reasons. One is the VRIN-features of the 
offerings and the knowledge-intensity of AI-associated activities, which suggests a higher 
average local unit value added than that of manufacturing activities. The second is that, 
according to our data, part of the surveyed firms’ customers are global firms’ local 
manufacturing and service subsidiaries. Consequently, specialisation in AI-associated 
activities contributes to the intensification of foreign-owned firms’ local backward linkages.  
Thirdly, the activities of the surveyed firms can definitely diversify the drivers of growth in 
Hungary and increase the relevance of growth through Schumpeterian entrepreneurship 
(cf. Lafuente et al., 2019) in DMEs. The meaningfulness (the aggregate economic impact) 
of this kind of upgrading depends, however, on the number and growth performance of 
these ventures.  
Our results suggest that the main difference between advanced economies and lagging 
DMEs does not lie in the performance (innovativeness, speed of internationalisation, 
turnover) of their top AI start-ups: these are more or less comparable. Underperformance 
can be captured rather in terms of company demographics and performance: DMEs have 
fewer high-performance start-ups producing AI-solutions.13 
Highlighting the indispensability of devising an adequate business development strategy, 
accompanied by a value capture strategy, these results have important managerial 
implications. They demonstrate that no matter how brilliant the technology is, without 
                                                          
13 For example, Israel, a dominant player in AI-technology, and a country with a size of population 
comparable to that of Hungary, was home of more than 1,100 AI companies in 2018 (Korbet, 2019). 
Roland Berger and France Digitale (2018) have built a database containing information on the AI 
ecosystem (number and density of start-ups) in 30 European countries (EU28, Norway, and 
Switzerland). According to the results of their mapping, except for Poland, the number of AI-start-ups 
was below 50 in all New Member States (NMS), in 2018 (it was over 300 in France and Germany, 
respectively, and over 800 in the UK). Except for Estonia (~1.15), start-up density (start-ups per 
population) was below 0.4 in in NMS (in Hungary: ~0.12).  
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adequate entrepreneurial skills, and without being visible on the global stage of ‘AI-start-ups 
to watch’, the development prospects of even the most innovative ventures are limited.  
The surveyed cases also demonstrate the importance of a precise value proposition. For 
example, when negotiating with would-be customers, companies need to quantify the 
speed of ROI, in addition to ‘advertising’ the innovativeness of the technology.  
As for the policy implications, our results call for enhancing and diversifying the support 
system to improve Hungary’s ability to exploit the potential of AI for value creation and 
capture. Launching AI-specific entrepreneurship programmes, setting up incubators and 
accelerators, increasing the volume of grants to specific stages of AI-research and 
commercialisation, and supporting the financing of AI start-ups’ growth and international 
expansion through venture capital funds promise good return on public investment.14 
Furthermore, it is particularly important to support the scaling up of AI start-ups, for example 
by systematically integrating AI-applications in public services, and by promoting the 
implementation of AI-powered solutions in the business sector. Issuing innovation vouchers 
for AI-deployment promises hitting two birds with one stone: in addition to supporting 
technology-oriented entrepreneurs it also contributes to improving technology adopters’ 
total factor productivity.  
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